

[REDACTED] #20-74

STATSPEC  
Approved For Release 1999/09/29 : CIA-RDP85T00876R000300040021S

1 OF 1

19 MAY 1971

TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA  
CONF

**Confidential**



# TRENDS

*in Communist Propaganda*


**Confidential**

19 MAY 1971  
(VOL. XXII, NO. 20)

This propaganda analysis report is based exclusively on material carried in communist broadcast and press media. It is published by FBIS without coordination with other U.S. Government components.

## **WARNING**

This document contains information affecting the national defense of the United States, within the meaning of Title 18, sections 703 and 704, of the US Code, as amended. Its transmission or revelation of its contents to or receipt by an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.



**CONFIDENTIAL**

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

FBIS TRENDS  
19 MAY 1971

## CONTENTS

Topics and Events Given Major Attention . . . . .	i
INDOCHINA	
VNA Statement Details Method of GVN Release of DRV Prisoners . . . . .	1
DRV, PRG at Paris Stress Need for Total U.S. Troop Withdrawal . . . . .	4
Hanoi, Front Exploit Alleged Opposition to War by POW's, GI's . . . . .	5
Le Duan Returns Home After Prolonged Stay in USSR, PRC Visit . . . . .	7
NLHS Peace Plan Endorsed by Hanoi, Moscow; Reported by Peking . . . . .	8
Media Note Thieu-Ky Election Rivalry, "Big" Minh Appearance . . . . .	11
SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS	
Moscow Seeks to Discredit Current Chinese Policies . . . . .	13
MIDDLE EAST	
Moscow Gives Terse Accounts of UAR Leadership Changes . . . . .	17
FORCES IN EUROPE	
Brezhnev, Kosygin Voice Interest in Talks on Force Levels . . . . .	20
Mansfield Amendment: Stress on Administration Opposition . . . . .	22
FRG-CZECHOSLOVAKIA	
"Frank" Exchange Marks Second Round of Bilateral Talks . . . . .	24
SLOVAK PARTY CONGRESS	
Lenart, Husak Set Line on 1968 "Extraordinary" Congress . . . . .	26
Husak Eulogizes Conservative Bilak While Sniping at Novotny . . . . .	28
PRC INTERNAL AFFAIRS	
New Party Committees Announced for Kweichow and Sinkiang . . . . .	29
Propaganda Reflects Leadership Problems at the Top . . . . .	31
SUPPLEMENTARY ARTICLE: CHINESE AND SOVIET PROPAGANDA ON THE PHILIPPINES . . . . .	
Peking Courts Normalization While Supporting Communists . . . . .	S 1
Peking, Moscow Compete for Loyalty of Philippine Communists . . . . .	
Soviets Press in Low Key for Diplomatic, Trade Ties . . . . .	

**CONFIDENTIAL**

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FBIS TRENDS  
19 MAY 1971

- i -

## TOPICS AND EVENTS GIVEN MAJOR ATTENTION 10 - 16 MAY 1971

Moscow (3205 items)

Georgian Jubilee	(--)	11%
[ Brezhnev Speech	(--)	6%
Indochina	(10%)	8%
[ U.S. Demonstrations	(7%)	5%]
WPC Meeting in Budapest	(--)	5%
Soviet Elections	(--)	5%
VE Day	(10%)	5%
Zionism & Soviet Jews	(1%)	5%
Middle East	(3%)	4%
Czechoslovak CP	(--)	3%
Anniversary		
China	(2%)	2%

Peking (1558 items)

Domestic Issues	(32%)	43%
Indochina	(27%)	27%
[ Le Duan in PRC	(--)	11%]
[ 1st Anniversary	(9%)	4%]
Sihanouk's Government		
[ U.S. Demonstrations	(7%)	2%]
Romanian CP Anniversary	(3%)	3%
PRC Workers' Delegation	(0.3%)	2%
in Albania		
PRC-Peru Trade Talks	(--)	2%
PRC-Cuban Trade Protocol	(--)	2%
Somali Government Delegation in PRC	(--)	2%

These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used to denote the lengthy item—radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, government or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are counted as commentaries.

Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.

Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues; in other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

- 1 -

## INDOCHINA

The Vietnamese communists continue to press the line that progress toward a peace settlement can come about only if the United States agrees to a date for total withdrawal of U.S. troops from South Vietnam. The communist delegates at the Paris talks on 13 May again assailed President Nixon for making total withdrawal conditional upon release of U.S. prisoners and the ability of the Saigon forces to defend themselves.

The VNA account of the Paris session again obscured specific allied proposals on the prisoner issue. Thus, there was no anticipation in the propaganda of the 13 May VNA "statement" which responds to the GVN offer to release 570 sick and wounded North Vietnamese. The VNA statement proposes that on 4 June both sides send unarmed ships flying Red Cross flags to an area south of the 17th parallel for the transfer of any "illegally detained patriots" who choose to come to North Vietnam. Previous GVN releases of sick and wounded North Vietnamese prisoners--in July 1970 and January 1971--had also been preceded by statements from Hanoi that similarly said those "detained patriots" who chose to come to the North would be welcome. The current statement differs only in its outlining of the DRV's formal participation in the transfer by the dispatch of ships, a procedure probably dictated by the much larger number of prisoners--570 as against the 62 released last July and the 37 released in January.

Hanoi and Front media praise as an "important peace initiative" the NLHS' "new proposal" for an immediate end to U.S. bombing over Laos, followed by a cease-fire and a discussion of the formation of a provisional coalition government by the "Lao parties concerned." Moscow also promptly endorses the proposal in low-level propaganda. Peking has merely reported the plan without comment.

Moscow's continued expressions of support for the Indochinese people include Kosygin's remarks at an 18 May luncheon for visiting Canadian Prime Minister Trudeau in which he expressed "alarm" at continued aggression in Indochina and reiterated support of the programs for political settlement put forward by the "patriots" of Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia. The DRV press publicizes Brezhnev's expression of "militant solidarity" with the Indochinese people in his 14 May Tbilisi speech.

### VNA STATEMENT DETAILS METHOD OF GVN RELEASE OF DRV PRISONERS

The VNA statement responding to the GVN offer to release 570 sick and wounded North Vietnamese prisoners obscures the fact that the

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
19 MAY 1971

- 2 -

proposal had been made at the Paris talks, a pattern that accords with Hanoi treatment of previous GVN releases of North Vietnamese prisoners. The VNA statement says merely that "on 29 April, on U.S. orders, the Saigon administration again announced the release of a number of Vietnamese illegally arrested in South Vietnam whom they called 'North Vietnamese prisoners of war.'"

Hanoi may feel that to explicitly acknowledge the GVN proposal advanced at the 29 April Paris session would be at variance with its insistence that discussion of the release of prisoners can take place only after U.S. agreement to a date for total troop withdrawal. Hanoi has also studiously ignored other allied proposals advanced at Paris for international inspection of prisoner of war camps and for the repatriation or transfer to neutral countries of captives who have been imprisoned for a long time.\*

The VNA statement calls the GVN "announcement" an "old trick" of the Nixon Administration, aimed at misleading public opinion. Typical of Hanoi's practice of avoiding explicit acknowledgment of the VPA presence in the South, the statement refers only to "patriots" illegally arrested and detained. VNA recalls that a 24 December 1970 DRV statement said that any "patriot" released by the allied side "who wishes to come and settle in North Vietnam will be received and assisted by the DRV Government." Not surprisingly, VNA fails to indicate that the DRV statement--as well as one from the PRG that it cites--was issued in response

---

\* The suggestion that sick and wounded prisoners be released was tendered by GVN Foreign Minister Tran Van Lam in Saigon on 26 January, two days after the GVN's release of 37 DRV sick and wounded North Vietnamese on the occasion of Tet. The proposal was introduced at the Paris talks on 4 February by GVN delegate Pham Dang Lam. Lam recalled this proposal at the 22 April session, along with suggestions for repatriation or transfer to neutral countries of long-held prisoners, and on 29 April he specified that the GVN was ready to unilaterally release 570 sick and wounded. President Nixon, in his press conference that day, called attention to this proposal as well as to the one for the transfer of prisoners to a neutral country. Lam repeated the proposals at the Paris sessions on the 6th and 13th, but in the later instance he did not specify the numbers involved.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS

19 MAY 1971

- 3 -

to GVN Foreign Minister Tran Van Lam's 22 December announcement that his government would release a number of sick and wounded DRV prisoners on the occasion of Tet.

The VNA statement stipulates that the prisoners be transported on 4 June by unarmed U.S.-Saigon civil ships flying a Red Cross flag to an area south of the 17th parallel, where they would be transferred to unarmed DRV civil ships flying a Red Cross flag. It demands a 24-hour cease-fire in the area of the release and says that the allies must announce in advance "the number and characteristics of the ships transporting the patriots to be released this time." It provides that if the weather is bad, the release will be postponed until further notice, and it says the U.S. and Saigon administrations "must bear full responsibility for all consequences if they act counter to the abovementioned stipulations."

**BACKGROUND** There are precedents for VNA's outlining of the manner in which the GVN should release the prisoners. In response to delegate Lam's announcement at the 11 June 1970 Paris session that his government intended to release a group of 62 sick and wounded North Vietnamese prisoners as well as 24 North Vietnamese fishermen, the DRV on 23 June issued a VNA "authorized statement." That statement--in language identical to the current one--said that "on orders from the United States, the Saigon administration on 11 June again raised the issue of releasing a group of 24 North Vietnamese fishermen and 62 other people . . . whom they call 'North Vietnamese prisoners of war.'" VNA said that past practice must be followed and that the prisoners must be released at the 17th parallel or at a place adjacent to the DRV coast.

Last January Hanoi at first ignored the details of the GVN plan to release sick and wounded prisoners across the DMZ, spelled out by Paris delegate Lam at the 14 January session. An authorized VNA statement on 23 January countered by declaring that the same procedures must be followed as on 11 July 1970, then proceeded to spell out the details of how they would be released at sea. A 25 January foreign ministry spokesman's statement scored the GVN for its release the day before of the prisoners across the DMZ.

The matter of sick and wounded North Vietnamese prisoners held by the GVN also figured in Hanoi propaganda in 1968, during

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
19 MAY 1971

- 4 -

the U.S.-DRV bilateral talks in Paris. Thus, a VNA authorized statement on 11 August 1968--on the heels of Ambassador Harriman's announcement at Paris of the U.S. decision to release 14 North Vietnamese naval personnel captured during an engagement in July 1966--assailed what it called a "recent" Saigon government communique on the "so-called question" of releasing sick and wounded North Vietnamese prisoners. VNA reiterated the line--standard at that time--that any detainees in the South are either "southern compatriots" or DRV civilian or military personnel who have been arrested and detained illegally. It demanded "immediate" release of all DRV citizens.\*

#### DRV, PRG AT PARIS STRESS NEED FOR TOTAL U.S. TROOP WITHDRAWAL

The VNA account of the 13 May session of the Paris talks says both communist delegates stressed that in order for the Paris conference to make headway the President should set a "clear" deadline for the withdrawal of all U.S. and other allied foreign troops from South Vietnam. VNA says that DRV delegate Xuan Thuy "made clear the good will" of the DRV and the PRG for peace as "expounded in the fair and reasonable proposals for a correct settlement of the Vietnam problem" and that he "exposed the obduracy and bellicosity of the U.S. and Saigon administrations, which are seeking by all means to stall the Paris" talks.

VNA notes that Xuan Thuy repeated what Hanoi calls the "concrete proposal" presented at the 29 April session of the talks calling for immediate discussion of the question of a time limit for a total U.S. troop withdrawal so that the questions of ensuring the safety of the withdrawing troops and the release of captured military men may then be taken up without delay. Emphasizing that the PRG and DRV proposals are "still on the conference table," Thuy said the key point at present is that President Nixon must announce "on which day, in which month, in which year he will complete" the U.S. withdrawal from South Vietnam. He added: "Of course, the date chosen should be a reasonable one and not one implying a prolonged withdrawal." Xuan Thuy also said, although VNA does not report it, that "only after this question is solved can other questions, including the question of releasing captured military men, be rapidly solved."

---

\* See the TRENDS of 14 August 1968, page 4.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS

19 MAY 1971

- 5 -

PRG delegate Nguyen Van Tien--substituting for Mme. Nguyen Thi Binh, who was in Hungary--dwelt on U.S. "crimes" against the Vietnamese people. He also reiterated the offer that if the United States is unwilling to accept the PRG's 30 June time limit for U.S. withdrawal, "it may set another reasonable time limit for consideration by the parties concerned." He declared that the "appropriate arrangement of a deadline" for the withdrawal of allied troops "will create many favorable possibilities for the settlement of all other questions," and he added that "this is also a key point for a breakthrough" at Paris.

The VNA account does not acknowledge that Xuan Thuy made a point of the fact that the 13 May session coincided with the third anniversary of the start of the U.S.-DRV bilateral talks. He observed that after the United States "accepted the unconditional bombing halt" the bilateral talks should have been "at once" on 6 November turned into a four-part conference. He added that this did not happen until 25 January 1969 because of obstruction of "the U.S. warlike forces and the Saigon administration." VNA does note that in the course of his review of the Paris talks Xuan Thuy said that the Nixon Administration once "downgraded" the conference for over eight months. It also notes that he scored the President's May 1969 and October 1970 peace proposals as "plans for the materialization" for U.S. objectives: He "flatly refuted" the U.S. demand for a mutual withdrawal and "the argument about the question of U.S. POW's" and "the condition that it will withdraw only when the South Vietnamese develop the capability to defend themselves against a communist takeover."

Of the allied delegates, VNA says they "persisted in their fallacious and insolent arguments," which "were flatly refuted" by Xuan Thuy. VNA thus ignores the allied delegates' reiteration of proposals on prisoner-release, including Ambassador Bruce's offer of U.S. transport for North Vietnamese prisoners to any agreed neutral country.

#### HANOI, FRONT EXPLOIT ALLEGED OPPOSITION TO WAR BY POW'S, GI'S

A spate of Vietnamese communist propaganda sets out to document what is claimed to be growing opposition to the war among the U.S. military. The actions of the Vietnam Veterans Against the War and other servicemen during the recent antiwar demonstrations

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
19 MAY 1971

- 6 -

in the United States continue to be cited. And Hanoi as well as Liberation Radio have broadcast a series of purported letters from U.S. prisoners, most of them anonymous, in programs in English for American servicemen.

Hanoi radio's program for U.S. servicemen on 9 May carried a letter from "a group of captured GI's against the war" which the broadcast said had been released "some days ago by Liberation Radio." The letter detailed the 26 April PLAF command order on the proper treatment of U.S. troops who opposed the war and encouraged the troops to resist their military orders and express their antiwar sentiments. On the 15th, Liberation Radio's broadcast for U.S. servicemen featured a special program marking Armed Forces Day which it said was presented by a group of "captured U.S. servicemen against the war." After discussing the meaning of the recent antiwar demonstrations in the United States, the broadcast said that if the President refuses to end the war, it is up to the men who are fighting to end it. The broadcast also mentioned the PLAF command order and encouraged U.S. troops to act against the war. On the 14th, Liberation Radio's broadcast to U.S. servicemen carried a message from "deserter Michael Branch" who encouraged GI's to "help bring an end to the war." LPA on the 13th and Liberation Radio the next day carried a letter dated 1 May from an alleged group of Americans on "unauthorized leave" in Paris to Mme. Nguyen Thi Dinh, deputy commander of the PLAF, thanking the PLAF for "its open declaration of your support for our struggle, inside and outside the army."

On the 17th, Liberation Radio broadcast a message from a "group of captured GI's in South Vietnam" addressed to Senator Fulbright. It noted his support of the Hatfield-McGovern bill, thanked him for his efforts to end the war, and offered support of those efforts. On 11 and 12 May, Liberation Radio had carried messages from unnamed prisoners to California congressmen and to Senator Hatfield approving congressional opposition to the war.

Hanoi radio's domestic service on the 19th cited UPI as reporting that one Betty Alvarez, daughter of an American "pilot who was captured in 1964," had made a statement accusing President Nixon of using the problem of captured U.S. airmen as a pretext to prolong the war. It stated that she and her mother are initiating a movement to unite POW families opposed to the President's policies.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
19 MAY 1971

- 7 -

## LE DUAN RETURNS HOME AFTER PROLONGED STAY IN USSR, PRC VISIT

Vietnam Workers Party (VWP) First Secretary Le Duan returned to Hanoi on 16 May after a six-week stay in the USSR, where he attended the 24th CPSU Congress, and a five-day visit to the PRC. He arrived in Peking on 10 May and departed from Canton on the 15th after a tour of southern China.

Some elements in the propaganda surrounding Le Duan's tour seem particularly noteworthy against the background of his prolonged stay in the Soviet Union and recent developments in Sino-U.S. relations. While Moscow has aired its misgivings over these developments, particularly in an Indochina context,\* Hanoi has maintained its silence in keeping with its care not to offend either of its two big allies.

In describing Brezhnev's meeting with Le Duan on 9 May, the day before he left for Peking, TASS used a unique formulation when it said the talks had been held in an atmosphere of "complete unanimity and cordiality." It might be conjectured that there is indeed "unanimity" between Hanoi and Moscow regarding Peking's overtures to Washington but that, given its neutral stance, Hanoi would not be likely to say so publicly. Significantly, VNA's account of the talks used the stereotyped characterization "militant solidarity and fraternal friendship."

Some passages in Le Duan's speeches in China seemed calculated to please his hosts--perhaps as a way of balancing off his prolonged sojourn in the USSR. Speaking at a Peking banquet on the 11th, as reported by NCNA, he raised the issue of "Asian unity," a line used by both Peking and Pyongyang in the past. After speaking of China's role as the "great rear," he said: "Our front extends from Vietnam to Laos, to Cambodia, to China and to Korea; and it is constantly expanding." He had made no such remark in addressing a 26 March banquet in Peking en route to Moscow, although the Chinese had staged the event as a show of Asian unity and Chou En-lai had sounded the unity theme on that occasion. Most recently, Peking has given the Asian unity line authoritative expression in its joint editorial commemorating Mao's 20 May 1970 statement. The editorial declares that in the face of "frenzied U.S. imperialist aggression in Asia, the people of China, Korea, Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos have further strengthened their revolutionary unity."

---

\* See the Sino-Soviet Relations section of this TRENDS.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
19 MAY 1971

- 8 -

Speaking in Canton on the 15th, Le Duan declared, after noting that Kwangtung Province borders on Vietnam: "There exists a profound revolutionary friendship between us. Both in the present struggle against U.S. aggression and for national salvation and in the greater struggles in the future, we will fight shoulder to shoulder until final victory."

#### NLHS PEACE PLAN ENDORSED BY HANOI, MOSCOW; REPORTED BY PEKING

Hanoi and Front media promptly praise the NLHS' "new proposal,"\* which provides for an immediate end to all U.S. bombing over Laos after which there would be a cease-fire and the "Lao parties concerned" would discuss the formation of a provisional coalition government and "other problems of mutual concern." The proposal is called a "new important peace initiative" in a NHAN DAN Commentator article on the 13th and an LPA commentary on the 14th. Both echo the NLHS in saying that in the face of the "current strained situation in Laos" caused by U.S. aggression, the initiative shows the Pathet Lao's good will in efforts to obtain a peaceful settlement on the "basis" of the NLHS' 6 March 1970 five-point program.

The VNA account of the 13 May Paris session says the allied delegates' "fallacious and insolent arguments" were "flatly refuted by Xuan Thuy, who condemned the Nixon Administration for expanding its war of aggression in Cambodia and Laos. He praised the peace initiatives of the Lao Patriotic Front."

The communist press spokesmen at the post-session briefing were unusually forthcoming in elaborating on the NLHS points in reply to newsmen's questions. The DRV spokesman, asked whether the cease-fire proposal applies only to the NLHS and RLG armed forces or to all troops in Laos, said it applies to "all" the armed forces in Laos. He stressed that the emphasis in the proposal on the demand for a total cessation of U.S. bombing over the whole territory of Laos is a point "worthy of note." However, in response to another question he recalled that a similar demand appeared in the five points and emphasized

---

\* The proposal was reported by VNA and the Pathet Lao news agency on 12 May in publicity for a communique on a 26-27 April NLHS-Patriotic Neutralist Forces conference. See the TRENDS of 12 May 1971, pages 13-14.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
19 MAY 1971

- 9 -

that the proposals on a cease-fire and talks on a coalition government are "new." He added that they "further clarify" the demand in the five points that there must be a bombing cessation "in order to create conditions making it possible for the interested Lao parties to meet." A Hanoi radio broadcast in English on the 17th summarized the DRV spokesman's remarks on the "new" aspects of the NLHS proposal but did not mention his comment that the cease-fire would apply to "all" troops in Laos. Hanoi media normally do not report the post-session Paris briefings at all.

Vietnamese communist media have not reported the PRG spokesman's comments at the press briefing when he was asked if it was not true that "to settle the Lao problem, the South Vietnam problem must be settled first." He replied: "If peace is restored to Laos earlier than in Vietnam, we will also welcome this." The Vietnamese communists are not known previously to have commented on the notion of a Laotian settlement preceding a Vietnamese one. The subject did not arise in comment at Paris on the NLHS five points in March 1970. In rejecting President Nixon's 7 October 1970 proposal on a broad Indochina conference, Vietnamese spokesmen had stressed that the problems of the three countries should be settled individually, in accordance with the peace programs put forward by each, but did not indicate the order in which they might be settled.\*

SOUPHANOUVONG LETTER  
TO SOUVANNA PHOUMA

It was not until the day after the NLHS proposal was released that Pathet Lao media reported that it had been dispatched to Souvanna Phouma in a letter from Souphanouvong--delivered by special envoy Tiao Souk Vongsak, who returned to Vientiane on 8 May. The text of the letter, as released by Vientiane on the 13th, says nothing about continued discussion of a meeting between plenipotentiaries of the two princes.

---

\* At a Paris press conference on 10 April 1970, asked about the French cabinet's 1 April suggestion of a broadened Indochina conference, Le Duc Tho had said, as reported by TASS, that a Vietnam settlement should be the basis of a settlement for all of Indochina.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
19 MAY 1971

- 10 -

VIENTIANE-HANOI  
RELATIONS

The Vietnamese and Laotian communists have predictably ignored Souvanna Phouma's appeal, in his 11 May Constitution Day speech, to the NLHS to break away from Hanoi's control and negotiate with the RLG. A DRV Foreign Ministry spokesman's statement and a statement by a spokesman of the NLHS Central Committee, protesting the stoning of the DRV charge d'affaires' car after he walked out on Souvanna Phouma's speech, once again merely vaguely accuse Souvanna Phouma of making "slanderous accusations against the DRV."

## MOSCOW

TASS promptly reported the new NLHS proposal on the 12th, and the next day TASS commentator Kharkov praised it as "a new important initiative paving the way for a political settlement in Laos." Asserting that the present Laos "tragedy" is caused "exclusively by American intervention," Kharkov said "it is clear that while American air piracy over Laos and other forms of armed interference in the affairs of this Indochinese state continue, there can be no hope that an atmosphere will prevail in which the Laotian sides concerned could discuss a peaceful settlement in the country." Moscow broadcasts to Indochinese and domestic audiences have praised the proposal in similar terms.

This prompt endorsement contrasts with Moscow's initially cautious reaction to the NLHS five-point program in March 1970, when Soviet media acknowledged the substance of the five points only after several days' delay. However, the plan was officially endorsed by Kosygin in a message to President Nixon-- summarized by Radio Moscow on 15 March--declining to join the President in supporting Souvanna Phouma's proposal for consultations among the signers of the Geneva agreement on Laos.

## PEKING

On 15 May NCNA reported that the NLHS-PNF joint communique setting forth the new peace proposal was publicized at a 12 May Hanoi press conference by a spokesman of the NLHS information office. NCNA carried the text of the proposal but offered no comment. On the 18th NCNA also reported without comment an NLHS Central Committee statement on the seventh anniversary of the inception of U.S. bombing of Laos; the statement includes an appeal to world peoples and governments to support the new NLHS peace proposals.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
19 MAY 1971

- 11 -

The acknowledgment of the existence of a peace plan contrasts with Peking's reaction to the NLHS five points in March 1970. At that time NCNA reported that the NLHS had issued a central committee statement but omitted all mention of a five-point peace program. Peking has subsequently officially endorsed the five points, however; an 8 March 1971 communique on Chou En-lai's visit to Hanoi said that the Laotian question should be settled in accordance with the five-point program of 6 March 1970.

#### MEDIA NOTE THIEU-KY ELECTION RIVALRY, "BIG" MINH APPEARANCE

Hanoi and Front media have publicized several items noting evidence of a "dispute" between GVN President Nguyen Van Thieu and Vice President Nguyen Cao Ky as opposing candidates in the October presidential election. Statements by Ky attacking Thieu have been cited, and LPA on 13 May noted Saigon press reports on the 11th which quoted Thieu as ruling out the possibility of the two men running on the same ticket.

While publicizing Ky's criticism of Thieu, the media make it clear that the Vietnamese communists regard the vice president as no different than Thieu, describing both men as "running dogs of the U.S. imperialists." A Hanoi radio commentary, broadcast in Vietnamese to South Vietnam on 13 May, cited statements by Ky critical of the Saigon regime and then went on to explain that Ky wanted to place the blame for the "rotteness" of the administration on Thieu and to represent himself as a patriot. In fact, the commentary claimed, "everyone knows that both Thieu and Ky are ugly traitors" who have incurred "a blood debt" to the South Vietnamese people and that they are now denouncing each other "because each wants to be the number one lackey of the Americans."

The rivalry between Thieu and Ky was also discussed in a Liberation Radio commentary on 14 May which quoted AFP as reporting on the 13th that Thieu had prevented Ky from delivering a planned address at a meeting in a Saigon cinema.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FDIS TRENDS  
10 MAY 1971

- 12 -

The other potential presidential candidate, Duong Van ("Big") Minh, has not been criticized by Vietnamese communist media, and references to him by Hanoi and the Front seem calculated to cast him in a favorable light. Thus LPA items on the 10th and 17th, in reporting 9 May ceremonies at the An Quang Pagoda marking Buddha's birthday, noted a speaker's calls for peace and criticism of GVN policies and added gratuitously that "retired general" Duong Van Minh was present at the ceremony. Monitored Hanoi and Front broadcasts in Vietnamese made no mention of Minh's presence at the ceremony, and the LPA reports did not note that Minh has been mentioned as a possible presidential candidate. An article broadcast by Liberation Radio last February did directly discuss the effect of Minh's potential candidacy on President Thieu.\*

---

\* For a report on this article and other attention to Minh in Vietnamese communist propaganda, see the TRENDS of 3 March 1971, page 23, and 12 November 1970, pages 5 and 6.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
19 MAY 1971

- 13 -

## SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS

### MOSCOW SEEKS TO DISCREDIT CURRENT CHINESE POLICIES

While Moscow continues to show restraint in commenting on recent Sino-U.S. developments, Soviet apprehensions over prospects of enhanced Chinese influence are reflected in efforts to arouse suspicion regarding Peking's motives and U.S. intentions, especially in the Indochinese context. A recurrent refrain is that Washington is linking its hopes for realizing its aims in Vietnam with Peking's policies. Though the Soviets have been careful to attribute this view to American observers, the manner in which it has been aired in Soviet media suggests a calculated campaign to play on fears among the Indochinese over a Sino-U.S. accommodation at their expense.\*

Moscow has refrained from commenting on Sino-U.S. relations in the central daily press, relying mainly on the foreign-affairs weekly NEW TIMES and LITERARY GAZETTE to convey its views. Undoubtedly discomfited by Peking's success in projecting a more reasonable and accommodating image after the excesses of the cultural revolution, the Soviets have countered by calling attention to less pleasing features of Chinese life today as well as to vulnerable aspects of Peking's foreign relations. Thus, LITERARY GAZETTE on 5 May carried the first of a series of eyewitness articles by "Soviet diplomat D. Karpil" on "China After the Cultural Revolution" depicting a bleak way of life marked by pervasive militarism and Maoist idolatry. Commenting that "a fact is a fact--China is preparing for war," the article warns that for the Chinese to launch a war would be "a fatal adventure" for them. The article was given wide dissemination in the Soviet provincial press.

---

\* Hanoi has remained silent on the visit of American sportsmen and journalists to the PRC. Against this background, an attempt by the Soviets to strengthen their hand with the Vietnamese may have been reflected in Moscow's unprecedented characterization of Brezhnev's talks with Le Duan as having taken place in an atmosphere of "unanimity." See the Indochina section of this TRENDS.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
19 MAY 1971

- 14 -

The second in the Karpil series, carried in LITERARY GAZETTE on 12 May, portrays discontent, uncertainty, and disarray in the Chinese educational system today. The militarist theme again appears, Karpil observing that the reduction in the length of education was designed to free resources for the development of the war industry. The third article, on the 19th, deals with Chinese agriculture, "the most acute problem in China today."

That the Soviets are smarting over the favorable publicity being given to the Chinese in the world press is reflected in an article in NEW TIMES No. 20 (14 May) taking scornful exception to recent British and West German articles. NEW TIMES takes a particularly sharp slap at the Chinese leadership, terming the cultural revolution a case of "unbridled great-power chauvinism" directed by "the Mao Tse-tung group against the CCP"--a strong polemical formulation that has appeared only rarely in Soviet comment in the past year. Seeking to discredit the stream of noncommunist visitors to China recently, the article takes special note of the visit by Klaus Mehnert, whose presence the Chinese did not see fit to acknowledge publicly. NEW TIMES describes Mehnert as a former Nazi intelligence agent who is "an inveterate anti-Soviet" author. According to NEW TIMES, his purpose in going to China was to gather material for a book in which he intends to praise the cultural revolution. "Of course, no comment is necessary," the article concludes.

In a striking sign of Soviet discomfort over Sino-U.S. developments, an article in NEW TIMES No. 19 went so far as to raise the specter of an "encirclement" of the USSR. Signed "D.V."--presumably Associate Editor D. Volskiy, who contributed an article to the previous issue disparaging Peking's stand on Cambodia--the article quotes a Canadian journalist as discerning "breathtaking possibilities inherent in the new turn in U.S.-Chinese relations." As outlined by NEW TIMES, these possibilities relate to a rapprochement between the PRC and the United States which would permit each side to concentrate its strength against the Soviets; thus, American power could be redeployed from Asia to areas like Europe and the Mediterranean to confront the Soviet Union, while Chinese forces now tied down by American power could be arrayed along the Sino-Soviet border. "What is this," NEW TIMES asks rhetorically, "if not a revival of the old plan to encircle the Soviet Union and the socialist community?"

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
19 MAY 1971

- 15 -

Moscow has generally avoided the sensitive border question in discussing the implications of Sino-U.S. relations, but this issue also figured in a Mandarin broadcast on 5 May which explained how Washington counts on Chinese passivity toward the war in Indochina. According to the broadcast, the U.S. calculation is supported by information from U.S. reconnaissance satellites showing Chinese missiles deployed in the north against the Soviet Union rather than in China's south, "the direction of actual threat."

**INDOCHINA** The tone having been set by the wide-ranging Kirichenko article in NEW TIMES No. 17 on "Peking's Diplomatic Game,"\* Moscow has made a point of linking recent Sino-U.S. developments with Peking's stand on Indochina. Rejecting the suggestion that Peking is engaged in a complex diplomatic game, Kirichenko saw the situation in stark terms. He made use of "the Vietnamese proverb" that "you can't hide an elephant in a basket" to lead into a harsh attack on the Chinese for easily betraying friends and alining themselves with "those whom they have just been calling enemies."

Moscow's tactic was illustrated by a 28 April LITERARY GAZETTE article rounding up foreign press reports following the exercise in "ping-pong diplomacy." The article juxtaposed a section headed "Great Expectations"--the Nixon Administration's hopes for using Chinese influence in behalf of its Vietnam policies--with a section headed "But Meanwhile . . ." containing reports on military operations in Indochina. It concluded by quoting an Indian paper's observation that the friendliness shown toward "the American government, which is destroying thousands of people in Vietnam, shows that the verbal facade of the Chinese leadership is simply a disguise for its real intentions."

A similar point was made in D. Volskiy's article on Cambodia in NEW TIMES No. 18. According to Volskiy, new calculations based on Chinese reactions emerged in U.S. strategy in Indochina after the incursion into Cambodia. Volskiy claimed that declarations like Mao's 20 May statement last year "proved to be merely propaganda maneuvers dictated by Peking's hegemonist aspirations." Significantly, in addition to Mao's statement Volskiy singled out the Chinese pledge to take all necessary

---

\* The Kirichenko article is discussed in the TRENDS of 28 April 1971, pages 19-21.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
19 MAY 1971

- 16 -

steps even to the point of "the greatest national sacrifices" as among these empty declarations. This pledge, made during Chou En-lai's visit to the DRV in early March and repeated in an editorial on the visit, has disappeared from Chinese statements of support for the Indochinese. Vietnamese and Korean spokesmen, on the other hand, have seen fit to remind the Chinese of their pledge in speeches made in Peking subsequent to the visit of the American table tennis team to the PRC.

Apprehensiveness about Peking's place in Vietnam's future was reflected in a Lugovskiy article in NEW TIMES No. 19 discussing Secretary Rogers' appeal at the recent SEATO session for the PRC to play a constructive role in Southeast Asia. Contrasting the Secretary's remarks with previous U.S. declarations calling for containment of China, Lugovskiy viewed with suspicion the way in which the question of Sino-U.S. relations was raised in connection with Vietnam. Lugovskiy concluded this discussion by striking a familiar note in current Soviet comment, citing American observers as believing that "Washington is linking with the Peking leadership's policy its hopes of achieving the aims in whose name the United States has been fighting unsuccessfully in Vietnam for many years."

TAIWAN      PRAVDA on the 7th carried a TASS account of the 4 May PEOPLE'S DAILY Commentator article rebutting a U.S. State Department spokesman's statement that sovereignty over Taiwan remains an open question. In carrying the account Moscow managed both to call attention to a tough issue complicating Sino-U.S. relations and to show Soviet solidarity with another communist country on an international question. In recent months both Moscow and Peking have selectively reported one another's statements on such questions.

A Moscow broadcast in Mandarin on the 7th pointed out, in connection with the PRAVDA report, that the Soviets have consistently opposed the two-Chinas formula and have voted for seating the PRC in the United Nations and expelling the Nationalist delegation. By implication, Moscow is putting the onus on Peking for any compromise on this question.

Moscow's account of the PEOPLE'S DAILY article cites its reference to the Cairo and Potsdam declarations as awarding Taiwan to China. In citing these declarations Moscow may have been seeking to buttress its own position in the dispute with Japan over the "northern territories" awarded to the Soviet Union as part of the World War II settlement based on these declarations.

- 17 -

## MIDDLE EAST

### MOSCOW GIVES TERSE ACCOUNTS OF UAR LEADERSHIP CHANGES

Soviet media have carried only brief news reports on the governmental and Arab Socialist Union (ASU) shakeup in Cairo, citing the MIDDLE EAST NEWS AGENCY (MENA). Similarly, TASS and Moscow radio had carried only a one-line acknowledgment, attributed to MENA, of the 2 May dismissal of 'Ali Sabri from his post as vice president.

TASS on 13 May promptly reported as-Sadat's acceptance of Interior Minister Jum'ah's resignation and the appointment of his successor; the further ministerial and ASU resignations subsequently announced by Cairo that day--including War Minister Fawzi, Presidential Affairs Minister Sami Sharaf, Information Minister Fa'iq, and ASU officials an-Nur, Dawud, and Shuqayr--were reported by TASS and Moscow radio on the 14th. In reporting the announcement of the new cabinet on the 14th, TASS listed the prime minister and the four deputy prime ministers without mentioning that all but one deputy prime minister, concurrently appointed to the information post, are holdovers from the previous cabinet.\* But the TASS account did pointedly note that ash-Shafi'i "is again" appointed vice president, as if to underline the absence in this cabinet of 'Ali Sabri.

In a two-sentence report on as-Sadat's 14 May radio and television address to the nation detailing what he called a planned coup d'etat, TASS that day merely quoted him as stating that the resignation of leading ASU officials and some ministers was caused "in the first place" by their opposition to the establishment of the Federation of Arab Republics (FAR).\*\* TASS additionally noted that as-Sadat proposed to hold new ASU elections. Echoing the TASS account,

---

\* MENA on 18 May, giving a factual account of the major resignations and appointments, did note that the prime minister and three of the four deputy prime ministers retained their posts.

\*\* Moscow has apparently failed to mention as-Sadat's joint meeting on the 14th with leaders of the other two FAR states, Syria and Libya, as well as an-Numayri of Sudan, linked with the other three countries in the Tripoli Charter.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS

19 MAY 1971

- 18 -

a Koryavin dispatch in IZVESTIYA on the 16th also mentioned that as-Sadat, touching on the Middle East crisis, affirmed that the UAR would seek a political settlement.

An 18 May TASS report on the situation for the first time suggests the extent of the changes in reporting that the resigned officials have been put under arrest and that a number of dismissals and new appointments have been effected in some ministries and departments, including the information ministry and the security service. Citing an AL-AHRAM report that as-Sadat has agreed to become supreme commissioner of the UAR police, TASS adds that the same paper said 110 people have been arrested on charges of "actions 'aimed against the interests of the people.'"

**BREZHNEV SPEECH** Brezhnev declared in his 14 May Tbilisi speech that the UAR, Syria, and other Arab states, "rallying together all patriotic progressive forces within their national and the general Arab framework," strengthening fraternal cooperation with the socialist countries, and giving a "resolute rebuff to the blackmail and outbursts of imperialism," will triumph in their just cause. His remarks seem to be a departure from the conventional Soviet propaganda appeal for Arab unity, typified in Podgornyy and Kosygin's call for the "strengthening of unity of the Arab countries and peoples" in their December 1969 message to the fifth Arab summit conference in Rabat. It is unclear what Brezhnev had in mind in referring to "patriotic progressive forces" and in specifying "national" as well as general Arab solidarity. He may have been intimating concern over the fall from power of Egyptian leaders commonly thought to be favored by Moscow. Or, in a broader context, he may have been alluding to the FAR, which has been supported by the Syrian CP, while the Sudanese CP has opposed Sudan's membership in the federation. The Sudanese regime, in turn, has been the target of protests by the Jordanian, Iraqi, Syrian, and Lebanese CPs for attacking the Sudanese communists.

Brezhnev's speech was cited by a "responsible official source," quoted in a dispatch from Moscow published in AL-AHRAM, as reported by DPA from Cairo on the 16th. The source is said to have declared that the USSR considers the governmental changes in Cairo as an internal matter concerning the UAR alone. The source further is quoted as saying, according to DPA, that the USSR is anxious to strengthen friendship and

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS

19 MAY 1971

- 19 -

cooperation with the UAR--a view that Brezhnev, the source claimed, expressed in his Tbilisi speech when he said the USSR would continue to support the Arabs' struggle.

**LEBANESE CP CRITICISM** The Lebanese CP daily AN-NIDA's concern over the events in Egypt is reported on the 17th in an East Berlin radio commentary which says the paper points out that following Secretary Rogers' visit, "certain circles on the Nile" are concentrating on appeals to end the confrontation with the United States, going so far "in their subservience" as to glorify the United States as the only force capable of resolving the Middle East crisis. According to an IRAQI NEWS AGENCY account on the 15th, AN-NIDA does not find the Egyptian situation reassuring in that it might weaken the UAR position in confronting the "imperialist-Zionist occupation and aggression." The purpose behind the Egyptian developments, AN-NIDA claims, is to appease the United States and to establish moderate forces capable of reaching an understanding with it, as well as to make further concessions to liquidate all the gains of the Arab liberation movement.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
19 MAY 1971

- 20 -

## FORCES IN EUROPE

## BREZHNEV, KOSYGIN VOICE INTEREST IN TALKS ON FORCE LEVELS

Brezhnev used his speech in Tbilisi on 14 May to put new focus on the proposal for reduction of armed forces and armaments in Central Europe that he had brought up briefly, as one ingredient in a potpourri of long-standing disarmament measures, in his 30 March report to the 24th CPSU Congress. The formulation in the 30 March report diverged from the usual pattern by failing to specify "foreign" armed forces. Now singling out the force-reduction proposal in the Tbilisi speech, Brezhnev noted that NATO spokesmen were asking whether the 30 March proposal concerns foreign or national forces, nuclear or conventional arms, and challenged them to clarify the issue by "starting negotiations" on this question.

Kosygin also broached the subject of troop and arms reduction on 18 May, at a luncheon in Moscow honoring Canadian Prime Minister Trudeau, but in terms of the old formulation stipulating foreign forces. In his remarks as summarized by TASS, he did not allude to Brezhnev's Tbilisi speech, nor did he specify Central Europe. He took note of "animated" discussions in the West on troop and arms reductions in Europe, particularly on the possibility of reducing the strength of "foreign" troops, and observed that "if the West displays readiness to take practical steps in this direction, we will do everything possible to reach agreement."\*

Available followup propaganda on Brezhnev's Tbilisi speech--confined largely to reportage--repeats his formula leaving open the possibility that a reduction of national as well as foreign troops may be negotiable. PRAVDA on the 15th and IZVESTIYA the following day carried roundups of favorable reaction to Brezhnev's remarks on troop reduction, including U.S. reaction.

---

\* Kosygin had repeated the language of Brezhnev's 30 March report almost verbatim at a 21 April luncheon for the visiting Finnish Prime Minister Karjalainen: On that occasion, he indicated readiness "to cut back armed forces and armaments in the regions where military opposition is particularly dangerous, above all in Central Europe."

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
19 MAY 1971

- 21 -

The PRAVDA roundup quoted Senator Mansfield to the effect that Brezhnev had advanced "a very good proposal"; and a domestic service report on the 17th, on the Senate debate on the Mansfield proposal for halving U.S. troop strength in Europe, said the Senator was the first American political figure to welcome Brezhnev's remarks. A foreign-language talk by Glazunov on the 18th described Washington's reaction to the Soviet proposal as "more or less positive" but declared that Secretary Rogers was less than forthcoming in his 16 May remarks on "Meet the Press" when he indicated "that Washington wants to know what the results will be even before starting the talks." Glazunov noted that Rogers indicated he would take up the Soviet proposal with Washington's allies at the NATO Council session in Lisbon in early June.

Moscow has not yet been heard to mention Ambassador Beam's 17 May meeting with Foreign Minister Gromyko at which they reportedly discussed the Brezhnev proposal. A RED STAR article reviewed by TASS on the 19th complains that the United States "has not responded so far" to the proposal.

**BACKGROUND** In line with the Central Committee report to the CPSU congress, neither Brezhnev in Tbilisi nor Kosygin in Moscow treated the force-reduction issue in the context of a European security conference. Long on record in favor of "foreign" troop cuts in Central Europe, Moscow has customarily placed the matter in a European security framework in recent years. In apparent response to the recurring NATO proposal for mutual and balanced force reductions, the memorandum of the 21-22 June 1970 meeting of Warsaw Pact foreign ministers in Budapest had suggested a means of discussing the matter in that framework.\* It proposed that a European security conference discuss "the establishment of a body concerned with questions of European security and cooperation," adding that in the Pact

---

\* The NATO proposal for mutual and balanced force reductions in Europe has long been under fire from the Soviet Union. Among other arguments, Moscow has contended that the question is an interbloc matter better suited for discussion at the Geneva disarmament talks than as an agenda item at a European security conference. Propaganda has also argued against the NATO proposal that Soviet forces be cut by 30 percent while NATO forces be cut by only 10 percent. For a fuller discussion, see the TRENDS of 1 July 1970, pages 26-27, and 3 June 1970, pages 18-19.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
19 MAY 1971

- 22 -

members' view "it would help to lessen tension and promote security in Europe if the reduction of foreign armed forces on the territory of European states were discussed," either in the newly proposed permanent body "or in other ways acceptable to the states concerned."

While more recent propaganda has not referred directly to the Pact proposal for a permanent body and the possible discussion of force cuts in that forum, Moscow continues to point to alleged wide support for the agenda outlined by the Soviet bloc states. For example, a Dmitriev article in PRAVDA on 11 May said that an understanding regarding the participants in a European security conference as well as its venue has been achieved by joint efforts, and "in essence there are no objections to the agenda proposed by the socialist states."

#### **MANSFIELD AMENDMENT: STRESS ON ADMINISTRATION OPPOSITION**

A flurry of Soviet press and radio propaganda in the past week has hailed Senator Mansfield's 11 May proposal--in the form of an amendment to a bill to extend the draft--to halve the number of U.S. troops in Europe by the end of 1971. According to TASS on the 18th, the Mansfield proposal enlists the support of "all progressive forces" who advocate abandonment of "the obsolete 'cold war' principles," liquidation of NATO, and the reduction of U.S. military expenditures, expenditures which have led to "serious socio-economic and financial difficulties."

At the same time, the propaganda predictably assails Administration efforts to "torpedo" the initiative. TASS on the 16th said President Nixon has decided to intervene personally in the "acute struggle" over the proposal, and a domestic service broadcast the following day reported that the President has called together "cold war experts" to drum up support for the Administration position. In the words of the broadcast, former Secretary of State Acheson "and other has-beens" have been asked to defend an outdated policy. The same broadcast cited newsmen for the observation that the President will go so far as to veto the bill if his Senate supporters cannot block the Mansfield amendment.

16 May dispatch in PRAVDA on the Senate debate reported that a State Department spokesman claimed that a reduction of U.S. troops in Europe would "harm negotiations concerned essentially

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
19 MAY 1971

- 23 -

with a genuine, balanced, and reciprocal reduction in the numbers of armed forces." The spokesman went on to say, according to PRAVDA, that "it would be tragic if our country were to be deprived of its trump card at a time when the Soviet leadership is expressing renewed interest in a balanced and reciprocal reduction" in the armed forces in Europe.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
19 MAY 1971

- 24 -

## FRG - CZECHOSLOVAKIA

### "FRANK" EXCHANGE MARKS SECOND ROUND OF BILATERAL TALKS

Prague media's report of the communique on the second round of Czechoslovak-FRG exploratory talks, held 13-14 May in Bonn, reflects evident lack of progress toward a compromise formula on the invalidity of the Munich Agreement--the chief obstacle to the inception of formal negotiations on the normalization of relations. CTK reports the communique as saying that the talks were "frank and to the point and contributed to a mutual clarification of views." The CTK report registers, in lower key, essentially the same appraisal conveyed by the Bonn representative, FRG State Secretary Frank, on West German TV on the 14th. In remarks unacknowledged by Prague media, Frank said the two sides presented their positions "with all objective harshness and all necessary precision" and made no progress. They did agree to continue the talks, the communique noting that the third round will be held in Prague.

Prague media have refrained since the inception of the exploratory talks from spelling out the Czechoslovak position, repeatedly and insistently aired in comment prior to the first round, that Bonn must recognize the Munich Agreement as invalid ab initio and must accept "all the consequences ensuing therefrom" before formal negotiations on normalizing relations can begin. But a brief Prague domestic service commentary on the eve of the second round seemed designed as assurance that the Czechoslovak side would stand firm on this position. Complaining that certain "rightwing" West German weeklies had failed to go along with the "reserved" treatment of Czechoslovak-FRG relations in the rest of the FRG press, the 12 May commentary rejected the suggestion of the FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE's Prague correspondent that Czechoslovakia is prepared to show "a certain magnanimity" on the Munich agreement issue.

In Prague media's only other commentary on the talks in the interval between the first round at the end of March and the second, a domestic radio commentary on 24 April had denied charges by another "rightwing" West German weekly, DER SPIEGEL, that the Czechoslovak side had been inadequately

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
19 MAY 1971

- 25 -

prepared for the initial round of the talks.\* There has been no discussion of the talks in the Czechoslovak central press since before the first round.

The Czechoslovaks did, however, use the 9 May 26th anniversary of the Red Army's liberation of Czechoslovakia and the 6 May first anniversary of the signing of the new Czechoslovak-Soviet friendship treaty to underscore their stock position on the Munich Agreement. First Secretary Husak, in a RUDE PRAVO article on the 6th, expressed appreciation to the USSR and "other allies" for their support of Czechoslovakia's "just demand that the Munich Agreement be recognized as invalid ab initio." And in IZVESTIYA on 9 May, CPCZ Presidium Candidate member and Federal Assembly Chairman Hanes repeated the formula in welcoming the support expressed by Brezhnev at the 24th CPSU Congress for Czechoslovakia's "just demand that the Munich Agreement be recognized as invalid ab initio"--again, as in Husak's RUDE PRAVO article, stopping short of tying the issue to the Prague-Bonn talks.

**SOVIET, GDR ENDORSEMENT** The Soviet Union and East Germany jointly endorsed the FRG-Czechoslovak talks in a communique on the one-day visit of a GDR party-government delegation led by Honecker and Stoph to Moscow on 18 May. Supporting the Czechoslovak line on the Munich Agreement, the communique stated that the USSR and GDR "assessed as a positive event in European life the meetings between Czechoslovak and FRG representatives at which the question of the invalidity ab initio of the Munich Agreement was raised."

---

\* See the 28 April TRENDS, page 28.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

THIS PAPER

19 MAY 1971

- 26 -

## SLOVAK PARTY CONGRESS

Bolstered by a strong Soviet endorsement of the success of his leadership, Czechoslovak Communist Party First Secretary Husak delivered a confident, relaxed speech at the 14 May session of the Slovak CP congress, naming names as he drew closer to the conservative wing of the party and heaped scorn on the liberals. The 13 May message from the CPSU Central Committee on the CPCZ's 50th anniversary had credited the Czechoslovak party with having "achieved normalization of the situation" in the country--in agreement with the identical claim made the same day in a PRAVDA article on the anniversary by Husak.

Husak recalled blandly at the Slovak congress that "in 1968 and later there was a lot of commotion in connection with our fraternal relations with the Soviet Union and the other allied socialist states." He added that "we cleared things up and put them in the right place, and with frank words we expressed our views on this subject." He went on to declare anew that Czechoslovakia's "existence" and sovereignty are "guaranteed" by the USSR and its allies and that he would continue repeating this standpoint "until the last citizen of our state understands this fundamental truth." He derided the "bourgeois propaganda" view--"and they say this with tears in their eyes"--that the CSSR is "some sort of occupied country" run by "collaborators or agents."

### LFNART, HUSAK SET LINE ON 1968 "EXTRAORDINARY" CONGRESS

The manner in which the forthcoming CPCZ congress will deal with the discredited Vysocany congress of 22 August 1968, the "extraordinary 14th congress of the CPCZ" held in secret the day after the invasion, was anticipated at the Slovak congress.\* Advance propaganda billed the Slovak congress as the first to

---

\* Despite the federative setup in the country, in effect since the start of 1969, the propaganda surrounding the Slovak congress presented it--as in the past--strictly in the context of preparations for the 14th CPCZ Congress, scheduled to open on 25 May. As an event of purely domestic import, it was not attended by any notable foreign guests.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS

19 MAY 1971

- 27 -

be held since 1966 and avoided any allusion to the "extraordinary" Slovak congress which met in Bratislava 26-29 August 1968 and endorsed the Vysocany congress.

The history of the 1968 Slovak gathering contains clear elements of potential embarrassment to Husak. Arriving in Bratislava from Moscow for the "extraordinary" Slovak party session on 27 August 1968, Husak strongly urged the Slovak party to accept the "honorable" Moscow settlement but identified his own stand with that of Dubcek, among others, in the "frank" talks which had preceded that settlement. The 1968 congress named Husak Slovak CP first secretary in place of the ultraconservative Vasil Bilak, then and now a favorite of the Soviets.

At the current Slovak congress the problem of how to treat the 1968 congress, and specifically how to exculpate Husak, was worked out in the report delivered by Slovak CP First Secretary Jozef Lenart at the 13 May opening session. Lenart divided the 1968 Slovak congress into an "anti-Marxist-Leninist first part" and a "principled second part" which started with Husak's arrival at the congress from Moscow. This formula, subsequently incorporated in the congress' final resolution on the 15th, was followed in Lenart's report by a ringing endorsement of Husak: "In April 1969 a comrade was elected as Central Committee First Secretary who did most for the defeat of the right wing and for leading us out of the crisis--that was and is Comrade Husak." Lenart hailed the August 1968 invasion at two separate points in his report, delivered before a demonstratively pro-Soviet audience, and recalled Husak's remarks at the 24th CPSU Congress expressing "sincere thanks" for the intervention.

Addressing the Slovak conclave, Husak wondered aloud whether "one should laugh" at the recent manifesto issued by liberal emigres Goldstuecker, Pelikan, and Sik which contended that the true 14th Congress of the CPCZ is the 1968 Vysocany congress, not the 14th CPCZ Congress scheduled to open on 25 May. He recalled that the 1968 Slovak CP congress--after his arrival there from Moscow--had "rejected the petit bourgeois, counter-revolutionary coup against our party," the Vysocany congress. Employing a crudeness he had not previously used against the liberals, he quoted from a book a line to the effect that "if the devil cannot harm you, he at least leaves a smell" and belabored the point by adding that "those Goldstueckers, those Pelikans, they cannot harm us, so at least they make a smell."

CONFIDENTIAL

- 28 -

### HUSAK EULOGIZES CONSERVATIVE BILAK WHILE SNIPING AT NOVOTNY

Registering his growing affinity for the conservative elements among the Czechoslovak communists, Husak paid warm personal tribute to Bilak, his predecessor as Slovak CP first secretary, a CPCZ Presidium member from April 1968 to the present, and a CPCZ secretary as well since November 1968. He recalled that Bilak, as Slovak party head, resisted "the growing rightwing and revisionist attack" in the pre-August 1968 period. As a result, Husak said, "a fair number of people blackened his name and spat upon his human and communist honor," despite Husak's own "many interventions" in getting Bilak elected to the new Slovak Central Committee at the 1968 congress. Declaring that "our party can be proud of such a proletarian fellow," Husak said that "if some people are speculating on any differences" between him and Bilak, they should be advised that "Václav Bilak . . . is one of the closest and most principled minded coworkers I know in the party leadership." The previous day, Lenart had put in a similar plug for Bilak's opposition to "antisocialist trends and revisionism" in the Slovak party in the pre-invasion period.

At the same time, promoting his image in the Slovak part of the country, Husak took several swipes at Antonin Novotny, the arch villain in Slovak eyes who allegedly held back Slovakia's development into a modern industrialized region. In the course of a lengthy attack on young writers opposed to his leadership, Husak remarked sarcastically that "Novotny played cards with them, so these writers were great," adding: "Recently I have heard that some people from this sphere say that things are worse than under Novotny." He also indicted Novotny in connection with the problem of Slovak nationalism, recalling that "several people--Novotny, Bacilek, and various other political corpses, as we may call them today"--showed lack of understanding and insensitivity to the problem of Slovak national pride, now "solved" through the federative system.

Having thus dissociated himself from some of the derelictions of the Novotny era, Husak went on to warn of the new responsibilities incumbent upon the Slovaks under the federation, remarking that "you can no longer blame Novotny" if something goes wrong in Slovakia today. In this connection he in effect further downgraded the federative setup, as Lenart had done the day before, stressing the primacy of "a united Czechoslovak awareness, based on our socialist system" and patterned on the Soviet concept of the multinational state.

CONFIDENTIAL

- 29 -

## PRC INTERNAL AFFAIRS

### NEW PARTY COMMITTEES ANNOUNCED FOR KWEICHOW AND SINKIANG

Ending a one-month hiatus when no new provincial-level party organ was reported, NCNA on 17 May announced the formation of new committees for Kweichow and Sinkiang. The namelists for the new committees contained no surprises, with present local leaders taking over the top party posts. Of the PRC's 29 provincial-level administrative divisions, 21 have now set up new committees.

#### KWEIYANG RADIO GREETS COMMITTEE

The formation of a party committee for Kweichow has apparently eased the factional problems which have long troubled the province. On 18 May Kweiyang radio ended its 20-month solid relay of Peking Radio and announced a summer broadcast schedule that includes local newscasts. Among the political originations broadcast the same day was a KWEICHOW DAILY editorial welcoming formation of the new provincial committee. Kweiyang radio had ceased broadcasting locally originated material on 30 September 1969. Now only Szechwan and Inner Mongolia, both without provincial party committees, remain awkwardly silent, with no local broadcasts.

Highlighting Mao's leadership of the CCP, the Kweichow party congress was held in Tsunyi--site of the 1935 conference which placed Mao in control of the party--rather than the provincial capital located at Kweiyang. With one other exception, all previous provincial party committees were established by local congresses convened in their respective capital cities. The Shensi party congress met in Yenan, Mao's former revolutionary base, rather than the provincial capital of Sian.

The Tsunyi congress, meeting from 7 to 14 May, was attended by 812 delegates, who selected the 72 full and 15 alternate members on the new committee. A five-man leadership group made up of two civilians and three military men heads the new committee.

Lan Yi-nung, Kweichow's leading figure for the past year, was named first secretary. Although Lan has never been formally identified as chairman of the revolutionary committee, actual control of the province devolved on him shortly after chairman Li Tsai-han dropped from public view in 1969. Early in 1970,

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

THIS TRENDS

19 MAY 1971

- 30 -

Lan was transferred to Kweichow from Szechwan where he had served as a standing member of the revolutionary committee. During local National Day rallies in October 1970, Lan was listed first among Kweichow leaders.

Chang Jung-sen, a military man with responsibilities within the Kweichow Military District (MD), was named secretary. Chia Ting-san, Li Li, and Ho Kuang-yu were named deputy secretaries. Chia, a newcomer to the province, is a senior cadre with several years of previous experience on the old Peking party committee. Li Li, vice-chairman of the revolutionary committee and pre-Cultural Revolution governor of Kweichow, is the sole named survivor of the group that headed the early "model" Kweichow Revolutionary Committee, formed in February 1967. Ho Kuang-yu, longtime commander of the Kweichow MD, has been identified as a vice-chairman of the revolutionary committee since 1969; he was involved in the January 1967 rebel effort to "seize power" in Kweichow.

Lan's keynote address to the congress applauded the greater unity which he claimed has been achieved within the province between the army, government, and people over the past year. He called for intensifying the serious study of Mao's works so that "senior and middle cadres" can protect themselves from "sham-Marxist political swindlers."

**SINKIANG COMMITTEE** The Sinkiang committee was formed by 725 party delegates meeting in Urumchi from 7 to 11 May. A five-man leadership group heads the new committee consisting of 67 full and 23 alternate members.

The top spot on the committee went to Lung Shu-chin, chairman of the revolutionary committee and commander of the Sinkiang Military Region (MR). Saifudin, vice-chairman of the revolutionary committee and deputy commander of the Sinkiang MR, was named second secretary. Tsao Ssu-ming, believed to hold local military responsibilities, was named a secretary. Sung Chin-ho and Liu Hsing, vice-chairmen of the revolutionary committee, were also named secretaries.

Both Lung and Saifudin addressed the Urumchi congress. Lung called for strengthening border defenses within Sinkiang--"an outpost in the anti-imperialist and antirevisionist struggle." Stressing themes also contained in the keynote addresses of the other border provinces with new committees, Lung linked the

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS

19 MAY 1971

- 31 -

need to improve militia work with criticism of "social-imperialism" for carrying "out subversive activities and armed provocations in Sinkiang on many occasions."

Saifudin, governor of Sinkiang from 1955 to 1967 and long the most important Uighur in the CCP, actually delivered two speeches to the congress, according to the NCNA account. At the opening ceremony, he conveyed Mao's "kind attention and encouragement" to the people of Sinkiang, and subsequently "on behalf of the regional party committee" he urged a struggle for "new victories in both revolution and production." Perhaps he is to maintain de facto control over the new party committee, from his position as second secretary.

**HOPEI COMMITTEE IN OFFING** Hopei appears a likely candidate for a party committee in the not too distant future. On 13 May the provincial radio broadcast a HOPEI DAILY editorial on democratic centralism which claimed new party committees for the "overwhelming majority of basic units and counties" within the province. Similar claims were issued previously by several provinces just before their new committees were announced.

#### PROPAGANDA REFLECTS LEADERSHIP PROBLEMS AT THE TOP

Current articles in Chinese media attacking "reactionary fallacies" may well be an offshoot of dissensions surrounding the long-absent Chen Po-ta and Kang Sheng. A HOPEI DAILY editorial on 13 May provided one of the clearest indications of top-level disharmony in the wake of the cultural revolution with an attack on "Liu Shao-chi and other swindlers," a formula now used with increasing frequency. It is alleged that these swindlers have "constantly undermined" proletarian centralism, enlisted turncoats, "formed cliques to pursue their own interests, and created an independent kingdom in an attempt to resist the CCP Central Committee" under Mao and Lin. The current campaign does not seem to be merely a revival of anti-Liu attacks, and it is presumably related to criticism of the "May 16 group," reported in non-media sources.

The central media's failure to observe the fifth anniversary of the 16 May directive of the CCP Central Committee, following extensive praise for the fifth anniversary of Mao's 7 May directive, lends support to the supposition that Kang Sheng continues to be in

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS

19 MAY 1971

- 32 -

serious trouble. Kang was mentioned in the 16 May directive as the only good member of the original cultural revolution "group of five."

Articles on philosophy written during the past winter and spring as part of the cadre reeducation campaign have generally been vague, with no clearly discernible target; however, their appearance beginning on the heels of the disappearance of Chen, considered for many years to be Mao's chief theoretical prop, suggested some relationship. An article in the fifth issue of RED FLAG by the writing group of the Liaoning Provincial CCP Committee, presumably controlled by Politburo member Chen Hsi-lien, seems to be an attack on theoreticians who have "tried to overawe people with words and phrases torn out of context from Marxist works." The article criticizes those who do not acknowledge "the dependence of knowledge on social practice." Although it is impossible to pin down current targets with any certainty, the focus of the attack seems to be leftists who maintain their own theoretical ideas even if they run counter to practice.

The decline of the "left" has been amply demonstrated in the formation of party committees. Of the first five "model" provinces to form revolutionary committees, four have now formed party committees; three of these were formed without the participation of their original chairmen, selected when the cultural revolution group under Chen and Kang was at the height of its influence. Only in Shanghai, where the leadership was perhaps selected on the basis of its ties to Mao rather than by the cultural revolution group, has the original leadership retained power. The only one of the original five models not to form a party committee is Heilungkiang, where there had appeared to be no trouble in recent years and which until after the disappearance of Kang Sheng led all provinces in announced county party committees. Provincial chief Pan Fu-sheng, who made frequent appearances in the past, has now been out of sight since mid-December, perhaps reflecting the political decline of his mentors.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS

19 MAY 1971

- 81 -

## SUPPLEMENTARY ARTICLE

### CHINESE AND SOVIET PROPAGANDA ON THE PHILIPPINES

The crosscurrents of Sino-Soviet competition for influence on the developing nations of Asia and Peking's dual-level approach to these noncommunist Asian countries are illustrated in recent propaganda treatment of the Philippines, reflecting both communist powers' efforts to improve their relations with the Philippine Government. While Chou En-lai met with the members of two unofficial Philippine economic missions visiting in China, Peking media sustained their propaganda attacks on the "reactionary Philippine authorities" and continued to express support for the armed insurgency of the Philippine New People's Army led by the pro-Peking Philippine communist party.

Moscow pressed its wooing of the Philippine Government with a visit by a Soviet friendship and cultural delegation; concurrently it registered its bid for local Philippine communist allegiance by publicizing a message of greetings to the 24th CPSU Congress from the Central Committee of the Soviet-lining Communist Party of the Philippines.\*

### PEKING COURTS NORMALIZATION WHILE SUPPORTING COMMUNISTS

There have been signs that Peking hopes to extend its current diplomatic drive to noncommunist countries in Southeast Asia, an area that has been a major target for Peking-backed armed insurgencies. An effort to test the ground for more normal relations between the PRC and its noncommunist neighbors has been indicated by the arrival of trade groups in China and gestures by Peking pointing to more amicable relations with governments that have been objects of severe propaganda

---

\* Moscow and Peking each refers to the group it supports as "the" Philippine Communist Party. For purposes of clarity this article refers to the Peking-lining CPP as the CPP/M-L, consistent with the nomenclature applied to the pro-Peking CP's of such other Asian countries as India and Australia, and to the pro-Moscow party as the CPP.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
19 MAY 1971

- S 2 -

attack. NCNA reported on 15 May that trade delegations from the Philippines, Malaysia, and Burma had attended the Canton spring export fair which closed that day. Earlier in the month Peking had announced the arrival of two unofficial trade missions from the Philippines and one from Malaysia.\*

Peking reported that the two Philippine groups were received by Chou En-lai for "a friendly conversation," met with Chinese trade officials, and visited historical sites. NCNA's coverage of the visits has not indicated any agreements or discussions looking toward agreements, but its report on the Canton trade fair pointed out that "trade personages from countries that have no diplomatic relations with China as yet showed their friendly sentiments for the Chinese people and expressed their strong desire for developing friendly trade contacts with China."

On two other occasions Peking has taken pains to demonstrate Chinese good will. On 8 November 1970 NCNA announced that the Chinese Red Cross had decided to donate food to Philippine typhoon victims. Similarly, Peking acted quickly to avert undue trouble in late March of this year when a Philippine airliner was hijacked to Canton by Maoist Filipino youths. NCNA reported on 31 March that after investigations the PRC "decided to give lenient treatment" and ordered the plane to "leave China quickly." There was no mention of the hijackers' political motivation or affiliation, NCNA noting simply that six passengers who "firmly refused" to return to the Philippines remained in China.

These Chinese moves suggest an effort to stimulate domestic pressure on the Philippine Government to take a more accommodating approach toward the PRC. The Philippines has diplomatic relations with the Nationalist regime on Taiwan, and it has voted against seating of the PRC in the United Nations. Moreover, the Philippines is a member of SEATO and has contributed personnel to the allied war effort in Vietnam. Chinese propaganda on the Philippines has focused on what it has portrayed as dominant American influence on that country's political

---

\* NCNA's reportage of the activities of the latter group used the term "Malaysia" for the first time, in contrast to Peking's past practice of referring to "Malaya" or occasionally quoting other sources' use of the federation's official title.

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
19 MAY 1971

- S 3 -

and economic life, a line calculated to appeal to nationalistic and anti-U.S. sentiment.

Peking has also sought to put pressure on the Philippine Government from another direction, in the form of propaganda support for the pro-Maoist New People's Army led by the C.P/M-L. Since a 4 August 1970 NCNA report, the first Chinese propaganda support for the Philippine communists since October 1967,\* Peking has periodically disseminated accounts of armed guerrilla actions against "reactionary troops and police." Peking has also played up the insurgents' propaganda activities among the people, reporting that the New People's Army propagates Mao's thought among the peasants and organizes them for armed struggle.

Peking has not, in its own name, directed polemical attacks at President Marcos personally, a restraint which the Chinese have also practiced toward the Burmese and Malaysian leaders. But the recently inaugurated "Voice of the People of Burma"--a clandestine radio following a Maoist propaganda line in support of the Burmese communist insurgency--in an 18 April commentary denouncing Burmese leader Ne Win's trip to the Philippines called Marcos "the reactionary President of the Philippines" and cited domestic pressures on him from "the people and the Communist Party of the Philippines." The commentary declared that no matter how much they may try to destroy their countries' communist parties, Ne Win and Marcos "can never avoid the doom of being overthrown by their own peoples." Another pro-Maoist clandestine radio, the "Voice of the Malayan Revolution," has also hailed the Philippine communists' armed struggle and the growth of the New People's Army "during the past two years."

No clandestine radio has yet been heard broadcasting in the name of the Philippine communists. The inauguration of the "Voice of the People of Burma" on 28 March has enabled Peking to follow a dual approach toward Burma, in effect permitting a division of labor according to which the clandestine radio propagates the revolutionary line while the PRC media observe the diplomatic constraints.

---

\*Peking's revival of propaganda support for the Philippine communists is discussed in the TRENDS of 12 August 1970, pages 32-33.

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
19 MAY 1971

- S 4 -

PEKING, MOSCOW COMPETE FOR LOYALTY OF PHILIPPINE COMMUNISTS

The Sino-Soviet competition for leadership of the international communist movement is reflected in the existence of two groups of Philippine communists, each laying claim to be the legitimate communist party of the country. Characteristically, both Peking and Moscow have manipulated propaganda attributed to their respective followers to air their competing ideological lines for the world communist gallery.

PEKING      NCNA on 29 January transmitted a 26 December 1970 statement of the Central Committee of the CPP/M-L commemorating the second anniversary of the reestablishment of "the Communist Party of the Philippines." The statement asserted that the party "as presently constituted by the advocates and practitioners of Marxism-Leninism-Mao Tsetung Thought" had "proven itself as the true inheritor of the revolutionary achievements of the proletariat" in the Philippines. "In preserving its revolutionary integrity," the statement continued, the CPP/M-L "pursues the rectification movement to the end against the Lava revisionist renegade clique and the Taruc-Sumulong gangster clique."

The "Lava revisionist renegade clique" refers to the followers of Jesus Lava, the pro-Soviet CPP secretary general captured in 1964. Taruc and Sumulong, who have been accused by ANG BAYAN--the CPP/M-L journal--of trying "to amass wealth privately" in collusion with "bourgeois politicians," were the recent leaders of the pro-Soviet CPP. Sumulong was captured in September 1970 by the Philippine armed forces and Taruc was killed in October 1970, initiating a period of chaos and factionalism within the CPP.

An NCNA commentary on 28 March 1971, commemorating the second anniversary of the founding of the New People's Army on 29 March 1969, noted that the CPP/M-L rectification campaign against the Lava-Taruc-Sumulong "cliques" was being pursued "to the end." Implying victory over the pro-Soviet groups, a New People's Army statement on the 29 March anniversary, carried by NCNA on 10 April, contended that "the complete collapse" of the Taruc-Sumulong "gangster clique" in "less than two years after its mass criticism and repudiation" had "totally vindicated the correctness of the establishment of the New People's Army under a communist party inspired by Marxism-Leninism-Mao Tsetung Thought." None of the propaganda has named the leaders of the party.

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS

19 MAY 1971

- S 5 -

MOSCOW After years of near silence on the CPP, Moscow on 12 April broadcast the text of a message of greetings to the 24th CPSU Congress from "the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Philippines." Observing that one of the main reasons "for our defeat in the '50's" was "self-isolation from the international communist movement," the message asserted that "the current leadership" of the CPP "is fully determined to adhere to the principles of proletarian internationalism." Taking note of the conflict with the CPP M-L, the message stated that the CCP's position was opposed "by a group in the Philippines that poses as a revolutionary force, but in fact is guided by the counterrevolutionary concept serving the Maoist leadership's aspiration to dominate in Southeast Asia."

Moscow had virtually ignored the CPP since January 1965 when it publicized the party's contention that liberation could be achieved in the Philippines by peaceful means. In late 1969 and early 1970 Soviet media carried a few brief items on the possibility of legalization of the CPP by the Marcos government. The CPP was identified by Western news sources as one of the two unnamed "clandestine" parties present at the June 1969 Moscow conference, but Moscow said nothing about its presence. The CPP was not among the parties reported by Moscow to have sent representatives to the Lenin centenary celebrations in Moscow in April 1970, and Soviet media did not mention the presence of a CPP delegation to the 24th CPSU Congress.

#### SOVIETS PRESS IN LOW KEY FOR DIPLOMATIC, TRADE TIES

Infrequent Soviet comment on the Philippines generally focuses on anti-U.S. events in the Philippines and on alleged U.S. exploitation of the Philippine economy and domination of Philippine foreign policy. In a continuing effort to improve state relations, however, Moscow publicized the August 1970 visit to the Soviet Union by a delegation of Philippine congressmen; extended relief through the Red Cross to Philippine flood victims in September 1970; and has reported allegedly growing sentiment in the Philippines for normalization of diplomatic and trade ties with the Soviet Union. On 6 May IZVESTIYA reported "great interest" aroused in the Philippines by the visit of a delegation from the Union of Soviet Societies for Friendship and Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries and noted that the delegation had been received by President Marcos.

CONFIDENTIAL